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Abstract
Competitive decision making may require controlling and calculative mind-sets. We examined this possibility in repeated
predator–prey contests by up- or down-regulating the individual’s right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), a brain region involved in
impulse inhibition and mentalizing. Following brain stimulation, subjects invested as predator or prey against a non-treated an-
tagonist. Relative to sham-treatment (i) prey-defense was relatively frequent, strong and unaffected by stimulation, (ii) down-
regulating predator rIFG produced a high-firing strategy—predators earned more because they attacked more frequently, while
(iii) up-regulating predator rIFG produced a track-and-attack strategy—predators earned more because they attacked especially
when their (non-stimulated) antagonist lowered its prey-defense. Results suggest that calculative mindsets are not needed to
compete effectively, especially not when the goal is to survive. Enhanced prefrontal control enables individuals to appear less
aggressive without sacrificing competitive effectiveness—it provides human predators with an iron fist in a velvet glove.
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Introduction
Humans have strong capacity for large-scale cooperation with
genetically unrelated others and unfamiliar strangers, allowing
them to live in cohesive groups, to form complex social net-
works, and to establish well-functioning societies (Ostrom,
1998; Henrich et al., 2001; Balliet and Van Lange, 2013). All too
often, however, humans also create costly conflict over turf and
territory, power and privileges, or ideas and ideologies
(Rapoport, 1960; De Dreu, 2010). In fact, as observed by political
economist John Stuart Mill (1859): ‘a great proportion of all ef-
forts in the world are. . .spent by mankind in injuring one an-
other, or in protecting against injury’, and such competitive
tendencies may wreck families and neighborhoods, undermine
work team effectiveness and decision quality, and hurt individ-
ual creativity and innovation (De Dreu, 2010). Yet, while these
economic contests and social conflicts can be physically risky,
emotionally depleting and collectively wasteful (Jervis, 1976;
Abbink, 2012; Simunovic et al., 2013), those individuals who win
and prevent defeat increase their relative wealth and survival
probability. Humans may thus be prepared not only for em-
pathy and cooperation but also for competition (Dawkins and
Krebs, 1979; De Dreu et al., 2010; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011).
Competitive strategies and success has been associated with
more calculative mindsets and controlled, deliberative decision
making (Sanfey et al., 2003; Knoch et al., 2006; Bhatt et al., 2010;
Rand et al., 2012; Halali et al., 2013; De Dreu et al., 2015a,b). If
true, competitive decision making, and its effectiveness, may be
associated with neural activation in the phylogenetically recent
prefrontal cortex involved in executive control, decision
planning and the inhibition of pre-potent responding (Rilling
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and Sanfey, 2011; Crone and Dahl, 2012). Here we pursued this
possibility by experimentally manipulating the functionality of
the prefrontal cortex while individuals made investment deci-
sions in a competitive predator–prey contest (PPC) (Carter and
Anderton, 2001; Abbink, 2012; De Dreu et al., 2015b). In this con-
test, two individuals (a ‘predator’ and a ‘prey’) simultaneously
decide how much to invest out of a given endowment.
Investments are wasted, but when predators invest more than
their prey, they acquire the remainder of their prey’s endow-
ment, who is left with nothing; otherwise, predator and prey
keep what is left of their endowments. Thus, while it is collect-
ively wasteful to invest anything, predators may decide to in-
vest to accumulate (relative) wealth, whereas prey may decide
to invest to prevent loss and subordination (Abbink, 2012; De
Dreu et al., 2015b; Carter and Anderton, 2001). Within such con-
tests, predators and prey compete successfully when invest-
ments defeat their prey, and prevent defeat, respectively. These
contests thus model key aspects of competition and conflicts
between, for example, burglars and home owners, prosecutors
and defense lawyers, terrorists and intelligence officers or in-
dustrial leaders preparing for vs protecting against hostile
takeover.
The prefrontal cortex encompasses a variety of brain re-
gions, each with distinct functionalities (Aron et al., 2003;
Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Crone and Dahl, 2012). Of pivotal
importance to predator–prey competitions may be the right
inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG), a prefrontal structure that comes
to full maturation in late adolescence only (Shaw et al., 2008;
Crone and Dahl, 2012). Of the range of socio-cognitive proc-
esses that are associated with the inferior frontal gyrus (for
reviews see, e.g. Aron et al., 2003), established functionalities
of the right hemispheric IFG include the regulation of self-
control and impulse-inhibition (Aron et al. 2003; Chambers
et al., 2007; Christopoulos et al., 2009; Casey et al., 2011;
Jacobson et al., 2011). In addition, the rIFG has been implicated
in mentalizing—the ability to take another’s perspective and
to predict another’s behavioral intentions and choices (De
Lange et al. 2008; Halko et al., 2009; Kuo et al., 2009). Both self-
control and mentalizing are core processes in social inter-
action in general, and in competitive contests specifically
(e.g. Decety et al., 2004; Edmonds et al., 2012; Molenberghs
et al., 2015).
In both human and non-human animals, defensive aggres-
sion recruits sub-cortical circuitries involved in intuitive re-
sponding, whereas aggression geared at subordinating others
and appropriating their resources is typically more controlled
and calculated (De Dreu et al., 2015b; Nelson and Trainor, 2007).
In predator–prey competitions, the rIFG may thus be more im-
portant for predation than for prey-defense. Specifically, in
predators, the rIFG may enable two distinct processes relevant
to competitive decision making. First, because down-regulated
rIFG associates with reduced self-control and impulse-inhib-
ition, down-regulated rIFG may enable heuristic rather than
pre-meditated competition that manifests itself in a ‘high-
firing’ strategy—relatively frequent attacks unconditioned by
the history of competitions and the antagonist’s (defensive) be-
havior. Second, because up-regulated rIFG associates with
enhanced impulse-control and mentalizing, up-regulated rIFG
may enable close monitoring of one’s prey to predict when
prey-defenses will be low and predator attack to be successful
and beneficial. Up-regulated rIFG would thus manifest in a
‘track-and-attack’ strategy—relatively in-frequent attacks that




Our study involved a double-blind sham-controlled cross-over
experiment with 18 healthy males who participated in three
sessions (Figure 1A). One to three months prior to the experi-
ment, participants underwent neuro-imaging to localize the
rIFG (Figure 1B), and at the beginning of a session, they received
neuro-navigated theta-burst stimulation (TBS) to temporarily
down-regulate (cTBS), up-regulate (iTBS) or leave unaffected
(imTBS) their rIFG (order was randomized across sessions and
participants). TBS is a form of transcranial magnetic stimulation
that manipulates a brain region for 2 min only, with effects last-
ing up to 40 min (Huang et al., 2005; also see Hamada et al., 2012).
In each session, participants played a 40-trial incentivized PPC
twice, once as predator and once as prey (each 40-trial block
paired to a new antagonist who was naı̈ve to the treatment
applied to the participant). On each PPC-trial, one individual
(henceforth predator) decides how much to invest in predation
(X) out of a e10 endowment (with 0X e10), while the other in-
dividual (henceforth prey) simultaneously decides how much to
invest in defense (Y) (with 0Y e10). Accordingly, we observed
18 participants  3 (sessions)  2 (blocks)  40 (trials)¼ 4320 in-
vestment decisions by participants, and another 4320 invest-
ment decisions by their non-treated antagonists.
Participants and ethics
A total of 36 healthy male individuals participated in three ses-
sions, with 7–10 days in between sessions. Eighteen underwent
TBS-treatment (henceforth ‘participants’) and another 18 did
not receive any treatment (henceforth ‘antagonists’). Non-
treated antagonists were matched to participants in terms of
sex and age (range 20–28, M¼ 25.16 6 2). Participants underwent
medical screening to minimize possible adverse effects of neu-
roimaging and TBS-treatment. We screened participants on his-
tory of seizures, neurological diseases and other factors that
may pose a risk for the application of TMS (Rossi et al. 2009). In
addition, and to ensure they were able to provide full informed
consent, eligible participants were invited for a pre-treatment
experience. In total, 20 people participated in this pre-treatment
session, in which they were shown the machineries and
allowed to experience the TBS-treatment (4 s of stimulation).
Two individuals withdrew from participation and 18 continued.
The experimental procedures, materials and treatments
received ethics approval from the Psychology Institute Ethics
Review Board of the University of Amsterdam (file AO-2501).
Prior to each session, participants and non-treated antagonists
received an information package about the study, detailing the
specific procedures and possible adverse effects. Upon reading
these, participants and antagonists provided written informed
consent. During sessions, at least one experimenter present had
a first aid certificate and medical assistance was available on
call. Neither experimenters nor participants reported any un-
desirable or worrying effects of TBS-treatment. This was con-
firmed when participants were contacted by phone 12–24 h
following participation. The TBS-treatment appeared well-sup-
ported without adverse effects.
Experimental procedures and timelines
Participants and non-treated antagonists all participated in
three sessions, in which they played one block of 40-trials as
predator and one block of 40 trials as prey (order
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counterbalanced between participants and across sessions).
Participants and antagonists were scheduled so that for each
block the participant was matched to a new antagonist that had
the same level of experience with the game (e.g. when a partici-
pant in session 2 started his third block, and thus had experi-
ence with two contest blocks, he was paired to a new antagonist
that also had played two blocks of trials in a previous session
but with different participants).
For participants each session lasted approximately 2.5 h for
which they received a standard show-up fee of e30. Antagonists
received a standard show-up fee of e7 for each 45-min session
in which they participated. Both participants and antagonists
could also earn up to e45 based on their decisions (across all
three sessions additional pay could range between e0 and 135).
As announced prior to each session, additional pay was
based on a random draw of three trials for each block played
and resulted in mean additional earnings over the three
sessions of e66.33 6 26.45 per person. Earnings were added to
the show-up fees and transferred to the individual’s bank
account.
Experimental procedures during a session differed between
participants and antagonists. The participants were scheduled
to arrive 45 h before the other participants would arrive. Upon
arrival, participants received all information including consent
forms and instructions for the PPC game. Then they underwent
one of three types of TBS-treatment (see TBS-specification and
Localization of the rIFG below). Thereafter, participants were
escorted to another laboratory, where their (non-treated) antag-
onist was already present and prepared for the PPC. Antagonists
were in individual cubicles, and participants were assigned a
different individual cubicle. Each cubicle was equipped with a
personal computer that was linked across cubicles; participants
and antagonists could not see or hear each other.
Antagonists were scheduled to arrive at the laboratory
15 min before the participant would enter, in order to receive
game instructions and fill in the consent form. To avoid losing
sessions because of unforeseen circumstances with TBS treat-
ment, we always scheduled and prepared more than one antag-
onist. Excess antagonists were paid their show-up fee and
dismissed without participating.
Once the participants were seated in the Behavioral Lab the
PPC was started (see Predator–Prey Contest below). Upon com-
pletion of the session, antagonists received a debriefing and
left, while the participants were escorted back to the TBS-la-
boratory for 45 min of resting time. This ensured that the effect
of the TBS-treatment wore off completely before participants
left the laboratory. Within 24 h following treatment, partici-
pants were contacted by phone to identify potential issues, and
nothing was revealed.
The experiment was carried out double-blind. The TBS pro-
cedure and the behavioral experiment were supervised by two
different groups of experimenters. The experimenters for the
behavioral experiment were unaware of what TBS-treatment a
particular participant received, and those in the TBS-laboratory
Fig. 1. Experimental methods and procedures. (A) Timeline of one (of three) experimental session. (B) Individual brain stimulation sites from anatomical MRI scans and
the concomitant right inferior frontal gyrus coordinates in Talairach space that served as inputs for neuro-navigated TBS.
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were absent during the PPCs and unaware of the starting roles
participants would be assigned to.
TBS specifications and localization of the rIFG
TBS was delivered with the use of a 3.5 T MagStim Rapid2
Stimulator (Magstim Co., UK) and a figure-of-eight shaped coil
(70-mm outer diameter). Before the experiment commenced,
we determined the active motor threshold of each individual.
We followed the guidelines of the International Federation of
Clinical Neurophysiology (Rossini et al., 1994; also see Hinder
et al., 2014) to determine the minimum intensity that induced a
visible movement to the contralateral first interosseus dorsalis
muscle. Subsequently, we aimed the TMS coil at the right IFG.
The location of this area was determined, for each subject, with
the use of an anatomical MRI (per Figure 1A and B). We aimed
the Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) coil at the poster-
ior and ventral part of the inferior frontal gyrus pars triangularis
with the use of the Visor system and dedicated ANT software
(ANT—Visor system; ant-neuro.com). Specifically, 1–3 months
prior to the first experimental session, TBS-parties were brain-
scanned to localize their rIFG. Three-dimension TFE T1
weighted images were acquired using a 3T Achieva TX scanner
(Philips, The Netherlands) (time to echo (TE) 3.8 ms; repetition
time (TR) 8.2 ms; flip angle (FA) 8; 160 sagittal slices of 1 mm;
field of view (FOV), 2562 mm; reconstruction matrix, 2562 mm,
358 s). These images were used together with the Visor neuro-
navigation system to locate the rIFG pars triangularis for each
participant.
The TBS was applied using a Magstim Rapid2 stimulator. A
figure-8-coil was used, set at 80% of the active motor threshold.
Three types of stimulations were used, intermittent- (iTBS),
intermediate- (imTBS) and continuous TBS (cTBS). As the name
suggests, cTBS consists of a continuous stream of pulses which
decreases the excitability of the cortex, therefore decreasing IFG
activity. During iTBS 2 s of pulses are followed by 8 s of rest.
This stimulation sequence increases cortex excitability and will
boost IFG activity. Finally, during iTBS 5 s of pulses are followed
by 10 s of rest. In this stimulation sequence facilitating and in-
hibitory effects cancel each other out, maintaining the subject’s
baseline IFG excitability, also referred to as sham stimulation.
For all of the TBS treatments the total amount of received pulses
added up to 600 (Huang et al., 2005).
Predator–prey contest
The PPC Game (PPCG; De Dreu et al., 2015b) involves two players,
each with an endowment E. One individual (henceforth preda-
tor) decides how much to invest in predation (X) out of his or
her endowment E (with 0XE, with E¼ e10), while the other
individual (henceforth prey) simultaneously decides how much
to invest in defense (Y) out of an equal endowment E (with
0YE, with E¼ e10). If X>Y then the predator obtains all of
E–Y; added to the remaining endowment E–X, this leads to a
total predator payoff of: 2E – X – Y, while prey is left with 0. If
XY then predator appropriates nothing, leading to a payoff of
E–X for the predator and E–Y for the prey.
The PPCG is formally equivalent to a contest with a contest
success function f¼Xm/(XmþYm), where f is the probability that
the predator wins, m!1 for X 6¼Y, and f¼ 0 if Y¼X (Tullock,
1980; De Dreu et al., 2015b). Assuming rational selfish behavior,
with E¼ e10, the following mixed strategies for predator (with
probability of investing X denoted by p(X)) and prey (with prob-
ability of investing Y denoted by p(Y)) define a unique Nash
equilibrium for PPCG: Predator: p(X¼ 1)¼ 2/45, p(X)¼ p(X – 1)
[(12 – X)/(10 – X)] for 2X 6, p(X¼ 0)¼ 1 –
[p(X¼ 1)þ . . .þ p(X¼ 6)]¼ 0.4, and p(X)¼ 0 for X 7; Prey: p(Y)¼ 1/
(10 – Y) for 0Y 5, p(Y¼ 6)¼ 1 – [p(Y¼ 0)þ . . .þ p(Y¼ 5)]¼ 0.15,
and p(Y)¼ 0 for Y 7. Accordingly, in the PPCG it is collectively
irrational and wasteful to invest in either predation or defense,
because the money invested is lost for both predator and prey.
Nevertheless, it is individually rational to invest, as indicated by
the Nash equilibrium. On average, prey is expected to invest
Y¼ 3.38 per trial and predator X¼ 2.62, and the frequency of at-
tack (expected number of trials in which an investment is
made; range 0–40) equals 24 for predator and 36 for prey (De
Dreu et al., 2015b). Given the same logic, predators are expected
to earn an average of 10, whereas preys are expected to earn an
average of 4.
The PPCG was programmed in Presentation
(Neurobehavioral Systems) and was self-paced. Participants and
antagonists were explained the rules of the game prior to the
first trial of each of two 40-trial blocks. It thus was explained
that investments were always lost, that when the predator
(labeled Role A) invested more than the prey (labeled Role B) the
predator received what was left of his own endowment in add-
ition to the remainder of his prey’s endowment, and that if prey
invested equal or more than the predator both players would
keep what remained of their own endowment after the invest-
ment round.
At the beginning of each trial, both predator and prey
received an endowment of e10 and were prompted to make an
investment between 0 and 10. After each investment decision,
players received feedback (i.e. they saw each other’s investment
decision along with the payout to themselves and to their other
player) (see also Figure 1A). Upon finishing a 40-trial block, there
was a short break and roles and partners switched and players
played a second block of 40 trials. TBS-treated players’ starting
role was varied between subjects and across sessions following
a counterbalanced (Latin Square) predetermined schedule.
Measures and data analytic approach
Data analyses were restricted to participant decisions and out-
comes. We computed the following indices. Overall investment
was defined as the investment choice per trial, ranging between
0 and 10 (per Figure 1A). To examine the emergence of a high-
firing strategy vs track-and-attack strategy, we computed fre-
quency as whether, on a particular trial, an investment was
made or not (coded as 1¼yes, 0¼no); reported is the proportion
of investment decisions across 40 trials (range 0–40, linearly cor-
responding to 0.0–1.0). The high-firing strategy implies higher
attack frequency that is not conditioned by the history of play,
whereas the track-and-attack strategy implies a lower attack
frequency that is conditional upon the antagonist’s behavior on
previous rounds of the PPCG.
The PPCG allows the computation of several performance
indicators. We focused on two indicators of performance—
competitive success, and personal earnings. Competitive suc-
cess was defined as investments decisions being made (X,Y> 0)
resulting in victory to predators (i.e. non-treated prey’s earn-
ing¼ 0 on that trial) or prey survival (i.e. prey earning> 0).
Personal earnings were operationalized as the amount of
money earned on a particular trial (range e0–e19 for predators,
and e0–e10 for prey). We note that competitive success and per-
sonal earnings are qualitatively different aspects of perform-
ance, and both indices need not be correlated. For example, a
predator who invests 1 out of 10 has a low probability of
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competitive success, yet secures an earning of either (9; when
Y> 0) or 19 (when Y¼ 0); a predator who invest 9 has a high
probability of defeating its prey, yet earns either 0 (when Y 9)
or between 1 and 11 (when Y< 9).
Data were analyzed using generalized linear multilevel mod-
els (GLMM), which allowed us to include all sampled datapoints
in the analysis without the necessity to average over trials, time
points or decision makers within a dyad (Aarts et al., 2014; Kret
et al., 2015). Accordingly, dependency in the data is accounted
for, all variance in the data is maintained and with the possibil-
ity to include fixed and random factors, the statistical model
can be set up in such a way that it most optimally explains this
variance. Statistical models for overall investment, frequency,
competitive success and personal earnings held a four-level
structure, i.e. trial (level 1), nested in Role (level 2), nested in
Treatment (level 3), nested in participants (level 4). First-order
autoregressive (AR1) covariance structures were added to con-
trol for auto-correlation, and random effects were included to
control for individuals, session order and block.
We expected no effects for treatment in prey, and specific ef-
fects for treatment in predators. Accordingly, and to limit the
number of tests, only when we observed a significant treatment
 role interaction we proceeded by (i) examining a treatment ef-
fect within each role and then (ii) within predators further
decomposing the contrast between sham-treatment and (up or
down) TBS for predators (but not for prey). These decompos-
itions are listed in the Results section; Fixed-effects for the over-
all models are summarized in Table 1.
Results
Investment decisions
In 90% of all 4320 paired decisions, at least one dyad member in-
vested in predation or prey-defense (X,Y> 0). Inspection of the
frequency distributions of investment choices (Figure 2A and B)
shows that participants do invest, that investments are spread,
and that prey invest more than predators. Deviating from what
standard rational economic theory would predict (7,13,34), how-
ever, participants also over-invest (X,Y 7), which theoretically
should not happen. Furthermore, whereas the distribution of in-
vestment choices for prey is similar across TBS treatment
(Figure 2A), predator investment does differ, especially in the
frequency of ‘no-attack’ decisions (X¼ 0) (Figure 2B).
The patterns seen in Figure 2A and B were confirmed in
GLMM-analyses of overall investments, and investment fre-
quency. Prey invested more than predators (F¼ 48.025,
P¼ 0.001), and this difference was somewhat but not signifi-
cantly increased when the rIFG was up- rather than down-regu-
lated (Figure 2C; Role  Treatment, F¼ 3.629, P¼ 0.057). More
robust effects emerged for attack frequency (Figure 2D). For fre-
quency, the role  treatment interaction was significant
(F¼ 4.417, P¼ 0.036). As predicted, prey were not influenced by
treatment (F¼ 1.0922, ns). However, predators invested more
often when their rIFG was down-regulated relative to sham-
treatment (F¼ 4.490, P¼ 0.034), and rIFG up-regulation (F¼ 5.341,
P¼ 0.025).
Competitive strategies: high-firing vs track-and-attack
In subsequent analyses we examined whether and how treat-
ment modulated performance, operationalized as competitive
success and personal earnings. Competitive successes were
influenced by treatment (F¼ 2.972, P¼ 0.051) and treatment 
role (F¼ 3.753, P¼ 0.024). Prey survived most of their predator at-
tacks, independent of treatment (Mdown¼76.4% vs Msham¼
80.1% vs Mup¼75.0%; Fs< 1.88, ps> 0.15). Among predators,
both competitive success and personal earnings were condi-
tioned by treatment, albeit in rather different ways depending
on whether the rIFG was down- or up-regulated.
We considered first predators with down-regulated (vs
sham-treated) rIFG and found evidence for a ‘high-firing’ strat-
egy. Relative to sham-treatment, down-regulated rIFG produced
more attacks (per Figure 2D), more competitive successes
(Figure 3A; F¼ 5.451, P¼ 0.020), and higher personal earnings
(Figure 3B; F¼ 11.189, P¼ 0.001). Indeed, attacks predicted per-
sonal gain when rIFG was down-regulated rather than sham-
treated (Figure 3C; b¼ 1.460, t¼ 3.750, P¼ 0.001; attack  treat-
ment, F¼ 14.059, P¼ 0.001). This reveals that with reduced pre-
frontal control, predators adopt a rather aggressive high-firing
strategy that in dynamic competitions is relatively effective.
Next we considered predators with up-regulated (vs sham-
treated) rIFG and found little evidence for this ‘high-firing strat-
egy.’ Up-regulated rIFG did not lead to more attacks (per Figure
2D) or to greater competitive success (Figure 3A; F¼ 1.976,
P¼ 0.160). Although up-regulating rIFG (vs sham-treatment) did
lead to higher personal earnings (Figure 3B, F¼ 9.992, P¼ 0.002),
earnings were not predicted by attack frequency (Figure 3C;
b¼ 0.445, t¼ 1.274, P¼ 0.213; attack  treatment, F¼ 2.100,
P¼ 0.148). Instead, we found that predators with up-regulated
rIFG engaged in, and benefitted from, a ‘track-and-attack’ strat-
egy. We computed an index for change in the non-treated
antagonist’s prey-defense in the two rounds previous to the
(TBS-treated) predator investment decision (subtracting prey-
investment on trial-1 from trial-2; theoretical range
D-Prey¼10 toþ10). This D-Prey was not influenced by preda-
tor’s rIFG-treatment (all F 0.198, P 0.657), and predator at-
tacks lowered D-Prey (b¼0.264, t¼2.121, P¼ 0.034).
Analyses focusing on predator investments showed that
relative to sham-treatment, up-regulated rIFG caused predators
to attack more when D-Prey was negative rather than positive
(Figure 4A; Treatment  D-Prey, F¼ 6.188, P¼ 0.010). Put other-
wise, when prey lowered their defenses, predators with up-
regulated rIFG (relative to sham) were more likely to invest.
Importantly, this differential tracking of D-Prey also explained
higher earnings when predator rIFG was up-regulated (Figure
Table 1. Test-statistics for GLMM-analyses of participant’s behav-
ioral strategies and outcomes as a function of (interactions among)
treatment, role and trial
Investment Frequency Success Earnings
Corrected modela 31.353*** 86.318*** 142.946*** 217.263***
Treatment 0.038 0.127 2.972§ 0.534
Trial 7.698** 4.524* 1.448 1.493
Role 48.025*** 148.010*** 395.959*** 540.221***
Treatment  trial 0.134 0.003 2.143 1.464
Treatment  role 3.629¶ 4.417* 3.753* 5.136**
Trial  role 0.037 0.020 0.283 0.528
Treatment  trial  role 0.205 0.012 2.074 2.607
Note.




***P<0.001; Models included random effects for participant, and participant 
session number and first-order autoregressive covariance estimates for partici-
pant  session number  block.
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4B, relative to sham-treatment: Treatment  D-Prey, F¼ 4.081,
P¼ 0.044). (Sham-treated predators did not differ from predators
with down-regulated rIFG [Treatment  D-Prey, F¼ 0.849,
P¼ 0.357]). Thus, with up-regulated rIFG predators conditioned
their attacks more on lowered prey-defense, and therefore
earned more than when they had received sham-treatment.
Conclusions and discussion
In the dynamic predator–prey competitions studied here, indi-
viduals in the role of prey invested frequently in defense and
their competitive strength was unaffected by experimental ma-
nipulation of their rIFG. Possibly, competitive behavior geared
at protection and avoiding injury is relatively impulsive and
may be modulated primarily by subcortical brain circuitries
involved in threat-detection and emotion-based decision
(LeDoux, 2000; Nelson and Trainor, 2007; Delgado et al., 2008; De
Dreu et al., 2015b). Quite in contrast to this, we observed individ-
uals in the role of predator to be influenced by experimental
manipulation of their prefrontal functionalities, in terms of the
competitive strategies they employed, their competitive suc-
cesses, and their personal earnings. With relaxed prefrontal
control, and concomitant higher risk tolerance and reduced im-
pulse inhibition (Aron et al., 2003; Chambers et al., 2007; Casey
et al., 2011; Jacobson et al., 2011), predators engaged in a ‘high-
firing’ strategy that brought them competitive success and
increased personal earnings. With enhanced prefrontal control,
and concomitant increased impulse-control and ability to men-
talize (De Lange et al., 2008; Halko et al., 2009; Kuo et al., 2009),
predators engaged in a ‘track-and-attack’ strategy that is less
aggressive overall, but equally beneficial in terms of personal
earnings.
The interpretation of our results hinges on the assumption
that intermittent TBS (i-TBS) raised prefrontal excitability, while
continuous TBS (c-TBS) lowered excitability. Strongest evidence
for this assumption derives from meta-analyses revealing that
when applied to the motor cortex c-TBS indeed reduces excit-
ability, while i-TBS increases excitability (Wischnewski and
Fig. 2. Participants’ investment decisions in their role as predator and prey. (A) Distribution of investment decisions by prey, broken down by treatment and compared
with predicted values based on standard rational choice theory (game theory expects no prey investments7). (B) Distribution of investment decisions made by preda-
tors, broken down by treatment and compared with predicted values based on standard rational choice theory (game-theory expects no investments7). (C)
Investment as a function of treatment and role (displayed Mean 6 SE). (D) Attack (X,Y>0) as a function of treatment and role (range 0.0–1.0 corresponding to 0–40 attack
decisions; displayed mean 6 SE; * P 0.05; ** P0.005).
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Schutter, 2015; Chung et al., 2016). Our study is, however, one of
the first that applied TBS to cognitive/non-motor regions in
competitive contests, and it may be that the neural mechan-
isms producing the observed changes in behavior are due not
only to changes in excitability in the right IFG, but caused also
by changes in more distal cortical and/or subcortical brain re-
gions. However, while TBS can produce temporary changes in
deeper neural structures, or create network imbalances, the
amount of TBS pulses given (600 pulses in all three TBS condi-
tions), the location of stimulation (exactly the same location),
and the intensity of stimulation was all tightly controlled across
all different TBS conditions, and both i-TBS and c-TBS differed
from sham-treatment as predicted. Future work in this area
could merge TBS-treatment with neuro-imaging to verify that,
indeed, our treatments selectively increased or decreased activ-
ity in the rIFG and explore which neural circuitries and net-
works are affected, and how.
Our results can be understood well in terms of risk-toler-
ance, inhibition of pre-potent responding, and mentalizing abil-
ity—functionalities typically associated with the rIFG.
Nevertheless, two issues need to be addressed. First of all, there
is some evidence that rIFG-associated capacity for mentalizing
is involved in empathic responding (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009).
Empathic responding may be more prevalent among predators
than among prey, who can afford empathic errors less than
predators. Results fit the idea that up-regulated rIFG enhances
mentalizing, but reveal also that in competition and conflict
such mentalizing ability serves calculated attack rather than
pro-social approach. Possibly, rIFG-associated capacity for men-
talizing can be either ‘cold’ or ‘hot,’ depending on whether the
context determines whether others are primarily seen as antag-
onistic competitors, or as allies and potentially deserving others
with whom one wishes to cooperate (Decety and Cowell, 2014;
Keysers and Gazzola, 2014).
Fig. 3. Emergence and effectiveness of predator’s high-firing strategy. (A) rIFG-treatment predicts predator’s competitive success (range 0.0–1.0 proportionate to 40 pos-
sible victories; displayed mean 6 SE; * P0.05; ** P0.005). (B) rIFG-treatment predicts predator earnings (range e0–e19; displayed mean 6 2SE; * P 0.05; ** P0.005). (C)
Predator earnings from attacks as a function of rIFG-treatment (range e0–e19; displayed mean 6 2SE; * P0.05; ** P0.005).
Fig. 4. Emergence and effectiveness of predator track-and-attack strategy. (A)
rIFG-treatment and D-Prey predict predator attack (range 0.0–1.0 proportionate
to 40 possible victories; D-Prey values for 10, 9,þ10 are not displayed because
of low (<2) observations; displayed mean 6 SE). (B) rIFG-treatment and D-Prey
predict predator earnings (range e0–e19; D-Prey values for 10, 9,þ10 are not
displayed because of low (<2) observations; displayed mean 6 SE).







niversiteit Leiden / LU
M
C
 user on 06 Septem
ber 2019
Second, at a conceptually broader level, it may be that down-
regulating (up-regulating) the rIFG increased (reduced) relative
left-hemispheric approach motivation and reduced (increased)
right-hemispheric avoidance motivation (Harmon-Jones, 2003;
Nash et al., 2010; Roskes et al., 2011; Brookshire and Casasanto,
2012). Possibly, such enhanced approach motivation accounts
for the high-firing strategy we observed in predators with
down-regulated rIFG, and increased avoidance motivation ex-
plains the track-and-attack strategy we observed in predators
with up-regulated rIFG. However, whereas rIFG activity has
been linked to biobehavioral approach/avoidance (e.g. Gable
et al., 2015; but see Dambacher et al., 2015), we are unaware of
established linkages between approach motivation and a pref-
erence for high-firing strategy, and avoidance motivation and a
track-and-attack strategy. Thus, whether and how the rIFG—
strategy linkage during competitive contests is mediated by
biased biobehavioral approach/avoidance is a promising target
for new research.
By experimentally manipulating the region within the
human prefrontal cortex that regulates executive control and
mentalizing, we uncovered a particularly pivotal role of pre-
frontal control in competitive interactions, and obtained strong
evidence for the plasticity of the human brain—2 min of TBS
shifted the brain from on-setting high-firing vs track-and-at-
tack, and these effects lasted for at least 40 min of intense com-
petition. This malleability occurred even within a particular
experimental session, as participants switched from predator to
prey roles and with that, up-or down-regulating the rIFG
stopped or started to affect the type of competitive strategy em-
ployed. When self-defense is the key goal, prefrontal control
and deliberative decision making appeared to be of little import-
ance. However, when the individual aims at self-expansion and
the accumulation of (relative) wealth, disrupted prefrontal con-
trol enables a high-firing strategy that is relatively aggressive
and collectively wasteful. With enhanced prefrontal control, in
contrast, individuals were able to suppress such aggressive im-
pulses until their prey was likely to be most vulnerable.
Enhancing the functionality of the right hemispheric inferior
frontal gyrus provides human predators with an iron fist in a
velvet glove.
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